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LA RÉÉVALUATION DE LA STRATÉGIE DE L’OCDE POUR L’EMPLOI
The new OECD Job Strategy is a delight to 
read for us old hands, especially if we can assume 
(without anyone exactly saying so) that the most 
important Pillars in the strategy are those that 
come fi rst. I welcome the change from the previous 
strategy, where demand and supply sides were 
jumbled up, to a strategy where (after macroeco-
nomic stability) supply-side issues fi gure at the 
outset. So let me focus mainly on the supply side 
of the labour market and, especially, on the problem 
of mobilising the unemployed in France. I will then 
say a little about wage fl exibility, which should be 
central to the demand side, and about skills.
Mobilising the unemployed
If we look across countries or over time, we can 
see clearly that in the medium term, the demand for 
labour responds to the effective supply. Before the 
Pilgrim Fathers landed in New England, there were 
no jobs there, but after they landed, jobs sprang up. 
Or, to take a less obvious example, the labour force 
in Britain has grown by 212 percent since 1851 (see 
MITCHELL, 1992; OFFICE OF NATIONAL STATISTICS, 
2005); over the same period, the number of jobs has 
grown by 212 percent. So – ignoring the business 
cycle – a market economy always provides more 
jobs, if there are more people “effectively” seeking 
work. The issue is how to increase the “effective” 
supply of labour.
There are two big issues here. The fi rst is how to 
mobilise unemployed people so that they are more 
effective fi llers of vacancies. The second is how to 
get more people into the labour force. I will start by 
taking the labour force as given and talking about 
unemployment. The issue here is: How many people 
can be employed before infl ation starts increasing 
and economic recovery comes to an end? The 
problem is that as the demand for labour expands, it 
becomes increasingly diffi cult for employers to fi ll 
their vacancies. So the number of unfi lled vacancies 
increases, and wages get bid up until infl ation starts 
increasing. At that point we have reached the lowest 
sustainable level of unemployment.
How much unemployment there is at that point 
depends mainly upon how effective a system we 
have for mobilising the unemployed to fi ll the avai-
lable vacancies. That is the view which a number of 
us formed some twenty years ago, (see for example: 
LAYARD, NICKELL, JACKMAN 1991; OECD, 1990) and 
I can illustrate the point from the history of what 
has happened since then, since it provides a perfect 
real-world experiment to test the theories which we 
were proposing in the 1980s.
A natural experiment
Around 1990 there was a European boom. 
Vacancies in most countries rose to levels as high 
as in the previous boom that had ended in 1980. 
But unemployment remained high in every country. 
In some countries this paradox of high vacancies 
and high unemployment led to a public debate in 
which it became an accepted proposition that it 
mattered how unemployed people were treated. It 
was realised that if unemployed people were paid 
for doing nothing without being expected to fi ll the 
vacancies that arose, there would be higher unem-
ployment. So over the 1990s some countries tigh-
tened their benefi t regimes and at the same time 
introduced the principle that after a certain period 
every unemployed person must be offered activi-
ties which he or she must accept as a condition of 
receiving state support. Three of these countries 
were Denmark, Britain and the Netherlands, and 
the results by the year 2000 were remarkable (see 
Figure 1). In Denmark, unemployment was cut by 
more than half with no increase in vacancies, and in 
Britain and the Netherlands unemployment at given 
vacancies fell by 3 or 4 percentage points.
By contrast, France and West Germany made little 
changes in their policies towards the unemployed. 
As a result, the European boom of 2000-2001 
produced only small reductions in unemployment, 
while vacancies rose to record levels (see Figure 2). 
It is not often that politicians offer researchers such 
a neat natural experiment for testing their theories.
So the enduring high level of unemployment in 
France and West Germany cannot be blamed on 
lack of demand, because we can see what happened 
when demand was high. It is due to supply-side 
problems in mobilising the unemployed.
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Figure 1: Some Low Unemployment countries – during the 1990s unemployment at given vacancies fell
Unemployment: OECD Employment Outlook, various issues, European Economy 73, 2001, p. 274-275.
Britain: Labour Shortage Index.
Dei nition: ½ (% i rms reporting shortage of skilled labour +% i rms reporting shortage of other labour).
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey.
Netherlands: Vacancies.
Dei nition: Data refer to those vacancies for which someone is required within a short time.
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
Denmark: Vacancies reported to public employment ofi ces.
Dei nition: Number of vacancies at the end of the month which have remained vacant for more than one week.
Source: Data were kindly provided by the Danish Ministry of Labour.
Denmark
1990
1995 1993
1985
1980
1975
2001
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
2 4 6 8 10 12
Unemployment Rate (%)
V
a
c
a
n
c
y
 R
a
te
 (
%
)
Britain
1995
1990
1985
1980
2001
1975
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2 4 6 8 10 12
Unemployment Rate (%)
La
bo
ur
 S
ho
rt
ag
e 
In
de
x
Netherlands
1975 1980
1985
1990
1995
2001
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
2 4 6 8 10 12
Unemployment Rate (%)
Va
ca
n
cy
 R
at
e 
(%
)

Travail et Emploi n° 118 • Avril-juin 2009 • 25 •
LA RÉÉVALUATION DE LA STRATÉGIE DE L’OCDE POUR L’EMPLOI
Figure 2: Some High Unemployment countries – during the 1990s unemployment at given vacancies did not fall
Unemployment: OECD Employment Outlook, various issues European Economy 73, 2001, p. 274-275.
France: Labour shortage index.
Dei nition: Proportion of manufacturing companies that face difi culties in hiring.
Source: Survey data provided by INSEE, France.
West Germany: Registered vacancies.
Dei nition: Data refer to vacancies for jobs of seven days’ duration or more reported by employers to employment agencies to be i lled within 
three months and remaining uni lled at the end of the month.
Source: Federal Institute of Labour, Germany.
Note: From 1991 onwards, vacancies data include also East Germany, but given the small number of vacancies in East Germany we believe 
that this is not going to be a problem in our analysis.
Belgium: Registered vacancies.
Dei nition: Data refer to vacancies notii ed to the ONEM remaining uni lled at the end of the month. They include vacancies within the 
framework of “special temporary work” (Cadre special temporaire), youth apprenticeships and special vacancies (Troisième circuit du 
travail).
Source: Statistical Ofi ce of Belgium.
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Features of a good system
An effective system for doing this must be helpful 
but also fi rm. There is a huge variety of systems 
within the OECD, as you can fi nd in a wonderful 
OECD publication called Labour Market Policies 
and the Public Employment Service, and the 
lessons there are that an effective system needs four 
characteristics.
1. Benefi ts must be paid from the same offi ce that 
provides job-search assistance and monitors job 
search.
2. The unemployed person must attend the offi ce in 
person regularly. (It is every two weeks in Britain, 
and more often in Switzerland. But I believe that in 
France and Germany it is nearer to three months.) 
The unemployed person should have a personal 
adviser who provides active help – which requires 
a much better staffi ng ratio than exists in France and 
Germany today.
3. After not too long a period of unemployment 
a person should be willing to accept any job that 
is available.
4. There should be a maximum period before 
a person is offered some forms of activity: he must 
then accept one of these offers. The massive turnover 
in the labour market should make it possible to 
secure offers of regular jobs for most workers, if the 
offi ce tries hard enough. But there must always be 
some fall-back type of activity within the offi ce’s 
control.
Guaranteed activity
So which forms of activity is it most useful to 
provide? The most useful in descending order are:
– Regular job.
– Subsidised employment with regular employer.
– Subsidised employment on a project.
– Off-the-job training.
Many US studies done by the Manpower 
Development Research Corporation and others 
show that “work fi rst” leads to higher employment 
rates over the subsequent fi ve years than does “train 
fi rst” (GUERON, HAMILTON, 2002).
As regards subsidised work we should reject most 
of the supposed fi ndings about the so-called substi-
tution effects. When employers are asked how many 
extra jobs they created as a result of the subsidy, this 
is generally a very small fraction of the jobs subsi-
dised. But this overlooks the fundamental aim of the 
subsidy which is to mobilise the hard to place, thus 
releasing for other new vacancies the easy-to-place 
workers who would otherwise have taken the job 
given to the subsidised workers.
In Germany and France there have been impor-
tant reforms in recent years but further legislation 
is needed and, above all, speeding up. One problem 
is always the attitudes of those who work in the 
benefi t offi ces and the employment offi ces. Unless 
those who are administering the reform believe in 
it, it will not work. It took the British employment 
service some ten years to believe that what they did 
would really affect how many people were in work. 
To change the mindset is essential.
A bad job is better than no job
There is of course always the controversy over 
whether a bad job is better than no job. My answer 
is a fi rm yes. From the new science of happiness 
we now know enough of the causes of human 
happiness to make some quite fi rm statements. 
When a person becomes unemployed his welfare 
falls for two reasons – fi rst the loss of income, and 
second the loss of self-respect and sense of signi-
fi cance (the psychic loss). The pain caused by the 
loss of self-respect is (we fi nd) at least as great as 
the pain which a person would feel if he lost half his 
income (LAYARD, 2005). So unemployment hits with 
a double whammy – the loss of income hurts, but so 
does the loss of self-respect. That is why unemploy-
ment is so devastating, and why we would much 
prefer it if people were in work.
But people also have strong feelings about what 
kind of work they do. Their job satisfaction depends 
on their income from work but also on the other 
qualities of the work: the amount of autonomy, job 
security, human contact, quiet, and stress. Research 
on job satisfaction tells us how much this matters. 
But does a bad job bring less happiness than being 
unemployed? The longitudinal research evidence 
shows clearly that ex post most people who get jobs 
feel better than people who remain unemployed 
(even if ex ante they did not always expect this). 
Moreover, when a person works there are also gains 
to the taxpayer (lower benefi ts and more taxes) and 
higher profi ts to employers.
Thus the key issue for French unemployment is 
how unemployed people are treated. It is a great pity 
that the government recently gave more priority to 
the issue of employment protection, where, as the 
Jobs Strategy shows, the evidence provides no clear 
message about its impact on unemployment. It is 
also a pity that in earlier years there was a misplaced 
belief that cuts in hours of work or earlier retirement 
would reduce the equilibrium level of unemploy-
ment. There was never any reason to expect this, 
and all that these measures achieved was a reduc-
tion in the amount of work done.
Inactivity: the sick and disabled
Unemployed people are not of course the only 
group whose behaviour is affected by how they are 
treated by the benefi t authorities. Another important 
group is the sick and disabled. As the Employment 
Outlook shows, the number of working age people 
Travail et Emploi n° 118 • Avril-juin 2009 • 27 •
LA RÉÉVALUATION DE LA STRATÉGIE DE L’OCDE POUR L’EMPLOI
on disability benefi ts in most countries exceeds the 
number on unemployment benefi t. The numbers 
have been rising in most countries, even though the 
health of the population has been improving. But 
their numbers too can be reduced by a more positive 
approach to their problems.
A high proportion say they would like to work. 
So why not help them? In Britain there has been one 
of the most clear-cut social experiments that I have 
ever heard of. In seven employment districts there 
have been so-called Pathways to Work pilots, with 
other matched districts acting as controls. In the 
pilot districts every new person coming on to what 
we call incapacity benefi ts receives an hour-long 
interview with an employment advisor each month 
from months three to eight of his spell on benefi t. If 
he returns to work, he receives an extra £40 a week 
for the fi rst year of his employment. The effect has 
been a 45% increase in the numbers who leave 
benefi t within the fi rst nine months (ADAM et al., 
2006). The lessons are obvious.
Mental illness and employment
There is one snag: the policy has no effect on 
people who are mentally ill, as opposed to physi-
cally disabled. In Britain we have more mentally ill 
people on incapacity benefi ts than the total number 
of people on unemployment benefi ts. They mostly 
have either clinical depression or chronic anxiety 
disorders like agoraphobia. Unlike the physically 
disabled, they are not able to work unless they 
are cured of their illness. Modern evidence-based 
psychological therapies, especially CBT (cogni-
tive behavioural therapy), can lift at least a half of 
them out of their illness and a simple cost-benefi t 
analysis shows that if such treatment was offered to 
mentally ill people the Exchequer would fully cover 
its cost – through helping some people off incapa-
city benefi ts and helping others to avoid coming on 
to them (LAYARD et al., 2006) (See Table 1).
I did not see mental illness fi guring large in the 
OECD’s analysis. This may be because few people 
understand the size of the problem. Epidemiological 
surveys of the population show that in advanced 
countries at least one in six of the population would 
be diagnosed as mentally ill. It is a major reason for 
non-participation in the labour force, and it ought to 
become a standard dimension in all labour market 
analysis. (See Tables 2 and 3).
Table 1: Cost-benefi t analysis of provision of cognitive behavioural therapy (11 sessions) to persons suffering 
from clinical depression or chronic anxiety disorders (average values per patient treated)
Cost
£
750
Return to Exchequer in fi rst two years
Reduced benefi t payments and higher tax receipts
Health service savings
900
> 0
Return to society in fi rst two years
Higher output
Health service savings
Value of reduced suffering (using standard valuations)
1,110
> 0
3,300
Table 2: Employment rates and benefi t rates for people aged 16-64 (%)
Full-time 
workers
Part-time 
workers
Unemployed Inactive Total
% who are on 
incapacity 
benefi ts
No mental disorder 55 19 3 23 100 8
Depression 36 14 4 45 100 42
Phobia 22 11 6 61 100 54
Obsessive-compulsive 22 23 3 52 100 42
Panic disorder 30 20 5 45 100 35
General anxiety 42 18 4 36 100 24
PTSD 36 14 4 45 100 42
Source: Psychiatric Morbidity Survey, 2000. As before, phobia only includes agoraphobia and social phobia.
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Table 3: Days per year lost due to sickness absence 
per person of each type in employment
No mental disorder 5
Depression 24
Phobia 52
Obsessive-compulsive 34
Panic disorder 39
General anxiety 14
PTSD 24
Source: Psychiatric Morbidity Survey, 2000.
The demand side: wage ﬂ exibility
I have focussed so far on labour supply as 
a key issue throughout Europe. But there are of 
course problems on the demand side when there is 
a mismatch between the pattern of labour demand 
and labour supply, either by region, skills or age. 
The most obvious is the problem of regional imba-
lances, leading to high unemployment in East 
Germany, Southern Italy and Southern Spain. One 
element in a solution is migration, but the more 
one thinks of well-being as the ultimate object of 
public policy, the more one is aware of the costs of 
migration – the cost in disrupted families, in broken 
communities left behind, and in higher turnover and 
higher crime in the receiving region (see LAYARD 
op. cit., p 179-180). So how can demand for labour 
be increased in high employment regions? Since 
employer subsidies are very expensive, the key 
solution has to be relative wage fl exibility. The new 
Jobs Strategy recommends this in Pillar C where 
there are “uncoordinated sectoral agreements” but 
it should apply whatever the system of agreements.
Skills and apprenticeship
Finally, skills (Pillar D) – vital above all for a more 
equal society. I was delighted to see the emphasis 
on apprenticeship. As earlier OECD reports have 
shown, countries which use apprenticeship as the 
major route to non-university skills have lower 
youth unemployment and better transitions from 
school to work (OECD, 2001). Britain’s Secretary of 
State for Education is trying to guarantee an appren-
ticeship for every school-leaver who wants one. 
I hope he succeeds.
*
*       *
Let me end by congratulating the OECD again 
on its new strategy and DARES for putting on this 
conference. I hope it can indeed contribute to better 
policies for helping the French unemployed. As 
I read the evidence, France needs a radical re-think 
about how unemployed people are treated. The 
central idea must be of rights and responsibilities. 
The right to unemployment benefi ts and job-search 
assistance must be complemented by the responsi-
bility to look hard and to accept work when it is 
available. A system which effectively applies this 
idea must have the following elements:
– one offi ce only, providing both benefi ts and job-
search assistance;
– frequent attendance at this offi ce;
– a requirement to accept work that is available;
– after one year a guarantee of activity, which must 
be accepted.
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